Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been intrigued by humans' and animals' capacity to respond to abstract relations like sameness and difference, because this capacity may underlie crucial aspects of cognition like analogical reasoning. Recently, this capacity has been explored in higher-order, relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which humans and animals try to complete analogies of sameness and difference between disparate groups of items. The authors introduced a new paradigm to this area, by yoking the relational-matching cue to a perceptual-matching cue. Then, using established algorithms for shape distortion, the perceptual cue was weakened and eliminated. Humans' RMTS performance easily transcended the elimination of perceptual support. In contrast, RMTS performance by six macaques faltered as they were weaned from perceptual support. No macaque showed evidence of mature RMTS performance, even given more than 260,000 training trials during which we tried to coax a relational-matching performance from them. It is an important species difference that macaques show so hesitant a response to conceptual relations when humans respond to them so effortlessly. It raises theoretical questions about the emergence of this crucial capacity during humans' cognitive evolution and during humans' cognitive development.
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Introduction
Cognitive psychologists have long been interested in humans' and animals' capacity to respond to abstract relations like sameness and difference (Wasserman & Young, 2010) . James (1890/1950) referred to relational concepts as the keel and backbone of thinking. Relational concepts are one basis for humans' capacity for analogical reasoning and problem solving (e.g., Hummel & Holyoak, 1997). They figure prominently in humans' cognitive-developmental change (Gentner, 2003) . They ground theoretical discussions of language's role in supporting symbolic representation (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; Goldin-Meadow, 2003) . They could represent a pivotal discontinuity between humans' and animals' cognitive system (e.g., Locke, 1690; Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008) . For these reasons, a full understanding of the phylogenetic emergence of relational concepts is one of comparative psychology's premier goals. That understanding could help explain the emergence of this crucial capacity during humans' cognitive evolution, the timing of that emergence, and perhaps the distinctive character of the human cognitive system.
The issue of relational learning was crucial even in psychology's early behaviorism-cognitivism debates (Kohler, 1918 (Kohler, /1958 Spence, 1937) . It was realized that relational (e.g., Same-Different) tasks can require a cognitive abstraction beyond the primary stimulus qualities, 0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.08.001
